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Summary
In its July 22, 2004, final report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (also known as the “9/11 Commission”) proposed a five-part
plan to build unity of effort across the U.S. government in fighting terrorism.  The
commission’s report includes specific recommendations for “centralizing and
strengthening congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland security issues”
including a recommendation that Congress consider creating a joint committee for
intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as its model.
Created in the wake of the explosion of the first atomic weapon in the summer
of 1945, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE 1946-1977) has been
described as one of the most powerful congressional committees in history. 
Congress gave the JCAE exclusive jurisdiction over  “all bills, resolutions, and
other matters” relating to civilian and military aspects of nuclear power, and made
it the only permanent joint committee in modern times to have legislative authority.
The panel coupled these legislative powers with exclusive access to the information
upon which its highly secretive deliberations were based.  As overseer of the Atomic
Energy Commission, the joint committee was also entitled by statute to be kept “fully
and currently informed” of all commission activities and vigorously exercised that
statutory right, demanding information and attention from the executive branch in a
fashion that arguably has no equivalent today. 
This report provides an outline of the structure and history of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy and raises a number of issues that might be considered
by policymakers as they weigh the suitability of the JCAE as a possible model when
crafting congressional oversight mechanisms.  For example, one factor that might be
weighed by policymakers is evidence that shows that the JCAE was not created to
be one of  the most powerful committees in congressional history; it evolved into one
as a result of personalities and circumstances.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
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9/11 Commission Recommendations:
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy — A
Model for Congressional Oversight?
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also
known as the “9/11 Commission”), an independent, bipartisan commission was
created on November 27, 2002, by  P. L. 107-306.1  It was directed to “make a full
and complete accounting of the circumstances  surrounding” the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, “and the extent of the United States’ preparedness for, and
immediate response to, the attacks.”  As part of this charge, the 9/11 Commission
released its final report on July 22, 2004, which included “recommendations for
corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.”2  In its report, the
9/11 Commission “proposed a five-part plan to build unity of effort across the U.S.
government” in fighting terrorism. The plan includes recommendations for
“centralizing and strengthening congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland
security issues.”3
“Tinkering with the existing structure [of Congress’s system of intelligence
oversight] is not sufficient,” the report asserted.   “Either Congress should create a
joint committee for intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as its
model, or it should create House and Senate committees with combined authorizing
and appropriations powers.”4  The commission report further opined that the system
of “Congressional oversight for intelligence — and counterterrorism — is now
dysfunctional.  Congress should address this problem.” The members of the 9/11
Commission “have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old
model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one.”5
This report focuses on that portion of the 9/11 Commission recommendation
that urges Congress to consider the model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
(JCAE).  It provides an outline of the history, structure, and powers of the JCAE and
analyzes a number of issues that might be considered by policymakers as they weigh
the suitability of the JCAE as a possible model when crafting congressional oversight
mechanisms for intelligence.
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While the 9/11 Commission report does not give additional specifics supporting
this recommendation, one can imagine the reasons why it was advanced.  During its
30-year life, the JCAE was universally regarded as one of the most effective
committees in congressional history.  On behalf of the two chambers of Congress that
it served, the JCAE exercised strong oversight, coordinated and shaped policy in its
field, and played an enormous role in the development of atomic power and the
nuclear arsenal of the United States.  Among other accomplishments, one observer
noted, the JCAE has been credited with:
the decision to develop the thermonuclear bomb ... saving the Nautilus submarine
project from the hostility of the Navy brass ...[and] almost all of the
developments in  the domestic atomic power program.6
In short, what may have attracted the 9/11 Commission to the JCAE model is
the fact that the JCAE was established with extraordinary powers, to deal with what
was perceived as an extraordinary challenge facing the nation.   The commission may
view this situation as analogous to that of counter terrorism today.
Following the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima, Japan, in August
1945, congressional interest was extremely high regarding the international security
challenges posed by atomic power, as well as its potential for providing a valuable
source of energy for civilian purposes.  The issues posed by the advent of the nuclear
age precipitated a power struggle between the legislative and executive branches, as
well as between civilian and commercial interests and the military over the
appropriate allocation of power and responsibility for overseeing nuclear power.  The
ultimate outcome of that struggle was the creation of a five-member civilian Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) located in the executive branch and empowered to
oversee all aspects of atomic energy, and an 18-member congressional Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy located in the legislative branch that was empowered
with jurisdiction over the agency and the subject of nuclear power generally.
The JCAE has been described by those who have studied it as one of the most
powerful, if not the “most powerful congressional committee in the history of the
nation.”7  While the JCAE was certainly a committee of Congress, in many ways it
did not resemble a congressional committee, or at least few other congressional
committees before or since, serving as almost a unicameral legislature within the
bicameral Congress.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was powerful in part because it enjoyed
exclusive jurisdiction and had a unique structure.  Congress gave the JCAE exclusive
jurisdiction over  “all bills, resolutions, and other matters”8 relating to civilian and
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military aspects of nuclear power, and made it the only permanent joint committee
in modern times to have legislative authority.9 
The JCAE coupled these legislative powers with exclusive access to the
information upon which its highly secretive deliberations were based.  Simply put,
the JCAE had access to restricted data not available to other committees of the House
or Senate.  The joint committee jealously guarded that information and this gave the
committee tremendous power in its area of expertise.  
As overseer of the Atomic Energy Commission, the joint committee was also
entitled by statute to be kept “fully and currently informed” of all commission
activities.  It vigorously exercised that statutory right, demanding information and
attention from the executive branch in a fashion that arguably has no equivalent
today.
Creation of the JCAE
Against the backdrop of the dawning atomic age, Congress faced the question
as scholars Harold P. Green and Allen Rosenthal observed in their 1961 study of the
JCAE, of how to “maintain its position” in relation to the executive branch and, “deal
effectively with a vital national security program requiring secrecy, involving highly
esoteric technical data at the frontiers of scientific knowledge and necessitating
considerable urgency and flexibility?”10  
Following World War II, Congress was facing not only the challenges posed by
the atom, but also coming to terms with its own authority and position in relation to
the executive branch of government.  
In the summer of 1946, Congress had finally passed, after nearly two years of
study, the landmark Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which was motivated,
in part, by Congress’s desire to have more power and resources in relation to the
President.  The act, which gave birth to the modern congressional committee system,
made “improvements in such [House and Senate] organization and operation with a
view toward strengthening the Congress, simplifying its operations, [and] improving
its relationships with the other branches of the United States Government.”11  The
motivation for the “creation of the JCAE should be considered in the context of the
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effort made by Congress at about the same time to strengthen its position vis-a-vis
the Executive Branch by enacting the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.”12  
Congress was also engaged in additional efforts to make it equal with the
executive, such as enacting the Employment Act of 1946,13 which created in
Congress a  Joint Economic Committee charged with providing independent facts
and analyses to Congress on developing economic trends.  
One of Congress’s apparent motivations in creating the JCAE was to have a
uniquely powerful congressional panel to serve as overseer for the powerful Atomic
Energy Commission it had created.  According to Green and Rosenthal, references
to the joint panel in congressional hearings:
... dealt with the potential role of [a] joint committee in controlling the [new
Atomic Energy] Commission’s exercise of licensing authority; in safeguarding
the position of the military; and in keeping Congress informed about atomic
energy developments.  The Senate Committee’s report on the legislation
described the provision relating to the joint committee primarily in terms of
keeping Congress “fully acquainted at all times with the work of the
Commission.”  The report also suggested that the joint committee would “be in
a position to give substantial aid to the Appropriations Committee” and could
consider supplementary and amendatory atomic energy legislation as the need
might arise.14  
Less than a month after the explosion of the atomic bomb, Senator Brien
McMahon (D-CT) introduced legislation in Congress to establish a board composed
of executive officials to deal with the subject of atomic power.15  This was the “first
bill on atomic energy in the Senate.”16  It was reportedly a rudimentary proposal that
received little notice.
On that same day — September 6, 1945 — Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
(R-MI) introduced a concurrent resolution to create a joint congressional committee
which would study the issues associated with the development, control and use of
atomic energy and report recommendations to Congress.17  The Senate adopted
Senator Vandenberg’s resolution calling for a joint committee without debate on
September 27, 1945.18  Allies of the Truman Administration in the House, however,
opposed the Vandenberg measure, preferring instead to keep the subject of atomic
energy, “within the orbit of existing and Democratically controlled standing
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committees”19 and closely held by the military.  As a result, the House did not act on
the Vandenberg resolution.   
At the request of the Truman Administration, on October 3, 1945, companion
measures were introduced in the House by Representative Andrew J. May (D-KY)
and in the Senate by Senator Edwin Johnson (D-CO) to establish procedures
governing the security, handling and development of atomic energy.20  This
legislation was drafted by the War Department and would have placed control of
atomic energy squarely in the orbit of the military by having it overseen by a
powerful Atomic Energy Commission that would control all sources of atomic
energy and “conduct all necessary research, experimentation, and operations for the
further development and use of atomic energy for military, industrial, scientific, or
medical purposes.”21  The May-Johnson legislation was introduced in conjunction
with Congress’s reception of a special message from President Truman urging the
Congress to create such a structure to oversee atomic energy.  
The Truman Administration “intended to drive for passage of the [May-
Johnson] bill with the aid of the smooth working relationships which the [War]
Department had established with the Military Affairs Committees of both Houses.”22
When the  measure was introduced in the House it was promptly referred to the
Committee on Military Affairs.  In the Senate, however, a jurisdictional battle
erupted over the referral of the legislation, with several Senators expressing concern
that the referral of the bill to the Senate Military Affairs Committee would send the
message that “atomic energy is to be used only as a war instrument.”23
On October 22, 1945, Senator McMahon introduced a new resolution, S. Res.
179, providing for the establishment of a Special Senate Committee on Atomic
Energy.  In light of the House’s failure to act on Senator Vandenberg’s concurrent
resolution establishing a joint congressional committee, the Senate promptly adopted
the McMahon resolution to set up a committee of its own.24  Senator McMahon had
laid the groundwork for the success of his proposal by seeking the support of Senator
Vandenberg.  “Vandenberg knew his [previously introduced resolution for a joint
committee] was dead [in the House of Representatives].  The next best approach
would be to create a special committee in the Senate alone.”25  
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Although he was only a freshman, Senator McMahon was named chair of the
new Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, after fending off an attempt by
Senators from the May-Johnson camp to “capture control of the [new Special]
committee by arguing for appointment [of the chair] on the basis of seniority.”26
The debate on the creation of the Senate Special Committee, reveals some of
the thinking by Members that would later influence the structure of the JCAE.  For
example, the Special Committee had legislative power, an unusual addition to a
temporary panel, most of which were quite limited in their power and mission.  In
addition, during consideration of S. Res. 179, Senators rejected an attempt to expand
the Special Committee from 9 to 18 members, deciding instead to compromise on an
11-member panel.  Senator Vandenberg argued for a smaller atomic committee,
stating:
A special committee is created because of the fact that there is a special job
to be done.  It must be done in a concentrated way, as rapidly as it can be
done with full justice to the subject.  I feel that if there were to be a [larger]
committee, there would be a scattering of responsibility, and the result we
desire would not be achieved.  We all know what the experience is with
large committees.27
Senator Vandenberg further argued that a smaller committee would also be
more likely to be trusted by the executive branch and the military with secret atomic
information, observing that smaller numbers of Members could better handle
information that involved, “a certain element of secrecy.”28  Both of these
considerations would influence the size of the JCAE.
During debate, Senator Barkley, as Senate Majority Leader, expressed his
preference that Members appointed to the Senate Special Committee be made up of
Senators from “the important [Senate] committees ... which might claim jurisdiction
over legislation affecting” atomic energy, such as the Committees on Commerce,
Foreign Relations, Naval Affairs and Appropriations.29  While never codified, it
would later become the practice to appoint members regularly from the Armed
Services and Foreign Relations committees to the JCAE.
At the same time that Senators McMahon and Vandenberg were joining
forces to create  a Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy that would examine
atomic energy in its broadest sense, the House Military Affairs committee was doing
its best “to expedite the May-Johnson bill” that would place atomic energy squarely
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under the control of the military.30  The House Committee on Military Affairs
reported the May-Johnson bill favorably in November 1945.31  
Despite Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson’s claim that the May-Johnson
bill represented, “the views of the administration as well as the War Department”32
the drive for quick passage of the May-Johnson legislation began to slow in
November 1945 when the White House had second thoughts about the legislation.
The Administration feared the measure gave too much power over atomic technology
to the military at the expense of  the President’s executive authority.  Particularly of
concern to the White House were provisions of the May-Johnson bill that gave to the
Administrator of the Atomic Energy Commission broad authority, and severely
limited the President’s power to remove either him or other commissioners from
office.  As a result, shortly after the legislation was reported from the House Military
Affairs Committee, the President “privately withdrew his endorsement of the bill.”33
In the meantime, Senator McMahon’s new panel was holding wide ranging
hearings on various issues relating to the atomic bomb and atomic energy.  Those
hearings began on November 27, 1945, during which time Senator McMahon
developed a new bill that was introduced on December 20, 1945 as S. 1717.34  This
measure called for placing control of nuclear technology  in a newly created civilian
agency similar to that requested by President Truman and overseen by a joint
congressional committee similar in power to the Senate Special Committee on
Atomic Energy.  Unlike the May-Johnson proposal, this measure made the AEC
commissioners subject to the removal authority of the President.
After the McMahon special committee concluded its hearings the following
spring, it unanimously reported S. 1717 in an amended form with provisions for a
nine-member Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, equipped with legislative power,
to oversee all matters relating to atomic power.   The bill was passed by the Senate
on June 1, 1946.35  
Senate floor debate on S. 1717 focused primarily on the issue of patents and
commercial uses of nuclear technology36 and touched very little on the merits of or
necessity for a joint committee.  However, a lengthy explanation by Senator
McMahon of the bill that appeared in the Congressional Record provided the
rationale for establishing the joint panel:
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[this approach] is in line with our traditions that the Congress should play
a large part in such an enterprise as this bill contemplates.  Nothing could
be so necessary as that the Congress should have the means of watching
over [the new Atomic Energy Commission] to assist it with new laws when
new laws are required, to assess its operations and alter its powers and
structure when necessary, to be ready to adapt it continuously to changing
circumstances.37
Following Senate passage, S. 1717 was debated in the House on July 20,
1946.38  Again, the provisions of the bill establishing a joint committee were not
touched upon in debate.  Most of the House floor debate focused instead on concerns
raised by Members that the Atomic Energy Commission would keep private
enterprise from benefitting from atomic technology by closely holding control of
nuclear technology and the ability to patent it.  In addition, several Members
expressed concern about whether the proposed Atomic Energy Commission could
be trusted to safely keep the nation’s atomic secrets. 
It is clear from the debate, however, that some Members were uneasy about
the broad grant of power that was being given to the new Atomic Energy
Commission by Congress.   Representative Clare Booth Luce (R-CT) pointed out that
many Members were “torn between a distaste for the vast dictatorial domestic powers
[the legislation] confers on the five-man commission, and our fears that without it we
shall endanger our national security in a troubled world.”39  This sentiment might go
a long way toward explaining why many Members embraced a joint committee with
extraordinary power to oversee the AEC.
S. 1717 was passed by a vote of 256 to 79 on July 20, after a motion by
supporters of the May-Johnson approach to recommit the bill to the House Military
Affairs Committee for “further study” was rejected.40 
A conference report on S. 1717 was adopted by voice vote in the House on
July 26, 1946.  The Senate passed the report with no debate that same day.41  The
conference report was substantially similar in content to the measure as reported from
the McMahon committee.42  So much so, in fact, that one House conferee was heard
to complain that in the conference committee, “the House had never been given a
chance by the Senate conferees.”43 
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President Truman signed the legislation on August 1, 1946, which became
P.L.60-585.44 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created both the AEC and the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.  Because of the central role Senator McMahon played
in the legislation, some observers refer to the statute as the “McMahon Act of
1946.”45
Structure of the Joint Committee
The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 establishing the structure
of the JCAE were relatively brief and nonspecific.  The committee was to have nine
members from each house, no more than five of whom would come from one
political party. 
In fact, as Green and Rosenthal point out, in crafting the JCAE provisions of
the Atomic Energy Act, there is no indication that:
Congress considered potentially difficult mechanical problems such as the
technique to be employed in consideration of Presidential appointments to
the Commission requiring Senate confirmation and the question of whether
a Senator or representative would chair the Committee.  Even the basic
question of how bills would be reported out to the House and Senate seems
to have been unresolved.46
In retrospect, it may seem strange that the joint committee’s structure was so
loosely and informally defined.  Green and Rosenthal provided the following
hypothesis as to one possible reason for this:
One possible precedent for the [structure of the] joint committee may be
found in the informal practice that prevailed during the Second World War.
During that time, the entire atomic energy program developed by the
Manhattan Engineer District was kept from general Congressional scrutiny.
Requests for appropriations were hidden in the budgets of a number of
executive agencies and were passed on by the chairmen of the Senate and
House Appropriations and Military Affairs Committees, who constituted
an informal joint committee.  At the same time, these four men were
necessarily privy to secret developments in the program.  The proven
feasibility of this arrangement and its success in preserving security during
the war may have influenced the draftsmen of the 1946 [Atomic Energy]
Act.47
Membership of the Joint Committee.  Senate members of the JCAE
were appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and House members
were appointed by the Speaker of the House.  
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While there was also no specific provision delineating the seniority of the
Members appointed to the JCAE, it became the informal practice to choose more
senior Senators and Representatives to serve on the panel.  Over time, the JCAE
became “associated with the names of several Members of Congress who were to be
perceived as giants.”48  
Original appointees to the 18-member joint committee included Democratic
Senators Tom Connally of Texas and Richard B. Russell of Georgia.  Republicans
on the panel included Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.  House Democrats Chet
Holifield (D-CA) and Melvin Price (D-IL) were also appointed to the JCAE and
served on it for a number of years.49
“Texas Democrat and future President Lyndon B. Johnson joined the panel
as a House member in 1947, and later rejoined it as a Senator.  Other major names
from the joint committees’ roster include Senators Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM),
Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO), Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-TN), Clifford P. Case (R-NJ),
Everett M. Dirksen (R-IL), Albert A. Gore, Sr. (D-TN), Henry M. ‘Scoop’ Jackson
(D-WA), John O. Pastore (D-RI), and Stuart M. Symington (D-MO).”50
The object of this appointment pattern by leadership in each house was to
appoint Members who were “‘statesmen,’ who were old hands in the Congress and
therefore accustomed to its traditions and mores, who were judicious and
restrained.”51
Committee Balance.  The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 made no provision
for appointing specific members to the JCAE.  “However, it early became the
practice to assure that Members from the Committees on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services of the two houses were always among those serving on the Joint
Committee.”52  
The participation of Members from these committees made sense.  Not only
had the members of these panels been most active on the issues relating to atomic
energy, but the JCAE’s “predominant concern was with atomic weapons”53 and
having members with experience in these subjects was only logical.
In 1951, Senate Rules were amended so that up to three Senate members of
the JCAE served as ex-officio members of the Senate Committee on Appropriations
when the panel was considering its annual appropriations for the “development and
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utilization of Atomic Energy.”54  This ex-officio status continued for the remainder
of the JCAE’s life.  
No such arrangement existed between the JCAE and the House Committee
on Appropriations despite the repeated requests of House JCAE members.  As Green
and Rosenthal point out, relations between the House Members on the JCAE and the
chamber’s spending panel were simply not as cordial as the one their Senate
counterparts enjoyed.  Observers claimed that the House Committee on
Appropriations viewed the joint committee as an “irresponsible newcomer” and
Green and Rosenthal characterized the relationship between the two as “stormy.”55
Regional Balance.  Likewise, without any statutory requirement to do so,
the custom developed to provide for regional representation by Members on the joint
committee.  Of this regional representation, Green and Rosenthal observed:
State and regional balance has reduced the chances of strong, contesting
constituency blocs ....  An individual [Member] will, of course, try to
ensure that his state or district is not discriminated against when contracts
are let by the AEC ... however, internal divisions on the committee are
seldom provoked by geographical factors.56
For the period 1947 through 1960, this regional balance found an assortment
of Members, “8 from the Northeast; 6 from the Midwest; 8 from the South; 7 from
the Mountain region; and 8 from the Pacific States” serving on the JCAE.
No Limit on Service.  As Green and Rosenthal point out, there were no
term limits on service on the JCAE and membership on the panel did not count
against Senate limits on  service on major and minor committee assignments.  They
write, “Perhaps a critical advantage the JCAE possessed in recruiting Members —
one which assured a ‘buyer’s market’ — is that it is an ‘extra committee.’  In other
words, members in taking on a JCAE assignment have to give up no other committee
position in return.”57
This freedom to be on the joint panel without having to give up other
assignments led to a high degree of continuity in panel membership with
“comparatively slight turnover ....”58
Selection of the Chair.  No provision was made in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 for the rotation of the panel’s chair between the House and the Senate.  The
act simply provided that the joint committee would select a chair and vice chair from
among their members, with no specificity as to the political party or chamber from
which the chair should come.  Starting with the appointment of the initial members
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of the JCAE in 1946, and ending in 1953, the joint committee was chaired
exclusively by a Senator.  “Similarly, the Vice Chairman, during this period, always
came from the House.  In both cases, the offices were selected from the party then in
majority control.”59
Democratic Senator McMahon was the first JCAE Chair, until replaced by
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper  (R-IA) in 1947, when the Republicans took control
of Congress.  Senator McMahon reassumed the chair in 1949, and continued to serve
in that capacity until his death on July 28, 1952.  Following McMahon’s death, the
JCAE’s Vice Chair, Representative  Carl T. Durham (D-NC) served as acting chair
until after the 83rd Congress convened in 1953, when  Representative Sterling Cole
(R-NY) became the first JCAE chair from the House and the rotation of the chair
every Congress was formalized.
Staffing.  Under the 1946 Act, the JCAE was given wide leeway for staffing.
The act stated that 
...  the joint committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation
of such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic
assistants as it deems necessary and advisable .... [T]he committee is
authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of
the departments and establishments of the Government.60
To put this staffing authorization in perspective, the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 laid out a limit of “4 professional staff and 6 clerical
staff for all standing committees except Appropriations.”  The JCAE averaged “about
20 full committee staff members”61 at any given time over its thirty-year life, not
counting detailees from the Executive.
 
There were no subcommittee staff; all staff were employed by the full
committee.  Employees were, however, detailed to work on specific projects
undertaken by subcommittees.  
The 1946 Act also gave the JCAE unusual power in establishing staff salaries,
permitting the joint committee “to appoint and fix the compensation of such
personnel as it deems necessary and advisable.”  
JCAE policy also dictated that “an ad hoc subcommittee composed of the
ranking minority and majority committee members from each house has
responsibility for confirming the appointment of persons for professional
employment on the committee staff.”62
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Regarding the organizational structure of the JCAE staff, the joint committee
observed in an official 1976 print:
Due to the diverse subject matters encountered in the field of atomic energy
and the highly technical nature of the problems, the staff does not adhere
to a rigidly functional breakdown within its organization.  The staff is,
however, loosely organized into three groups, one responsible for military
matters, another for civil matters, and a legal staff.63
Voting.  If a majority of the 18 members of the joint committee voted
favorably, a pending motion or matter carried.  Despite being a joint committee, there
was no requirement, as is the case with committees of conference, “that a question
receive a majority vote from among the nine members of each body.”64
Subcommittees.  Throughout its 30-year life, the JCAE generally had six
or seven subcommittees.  Although members were assigned to sit on specific sub-
panels, all members of the JCAE were “invited and urged to take part” in all
subcommittee meetings.65  Longstanding subcommittees of the JCAE included
subcommittees on: Legislation; Agreements and Cooperation; Communities;
Security; and Military Applications.
“The JCAE subcommittees conducted detailed studies and made
recommendations to the full committee.  All legislation and all joint committee
reports were considered and approved by the full committee.”66
Legislative Procedure.  The joint committee developed by practice a set
of procedures governing consideration of legislation.  In the case of authorizing
measures, the chair and ranking member would ordinarily simultaneously introduce
a legislative proposal “by request” of the Administration.  After a series of hearings,
the JCAE would then report a separate “clean bill”67 to each chamber reflecting the
work undertaken in committee.
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When the JCAE reported legislation, “identical reports were sent to the House
and to the Senate, either simultaneously or within a few days of each other.”68  In
each instance, the report was filed in the House or Senate by the ranking member of
the appropriate half of the joint committee.  
In considering the measure on the floor, the second chamber would ordinarily
adopt the first acting chamber’s measure as referred, or differences would be resolved
through a brief exchange of amendments between the houses.  Issues were rarely so
much in disagreement that a conference committee was required to resolve them.
From 1958 until 1977, only four annual AEC authorization bills required a
committee of conference to resolve legislative differences in various aspects of
atomic energy policy — the fiscal years 1958, 1959, 1962 and 1963 annual
authorizations.69  This institutional lack of disagreement was a unique feature of the
JCAE that arguably added to its efficacy; simply put, the JCAE tried whenever
possible to  present a unified work product to the Congress.  Representative Craig
Hosmer (R-CA) a member of the JCAE, observed of this tendency:
Every effort is made to write a report that is acceptable to all members ...
only when a somewhat fundamental divergence of philosophical opinion
arises, do we issue a report containing separate or supplemental views to
those expressed by the majority of members.70
Duties and Powers of the JCAE
Unlike most joint committees, which are most frequently temporary bodies
with limited oversight power and no legislative authority, Congress assigned to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy an unusual and formidable arsenal of powers.
The committee combined both legislative and oversight functions which, for most
of the life of the committee, essentially preempted all other congressional committees
except the Committee on Appropriations, from having any say whatever over the
items in the JCAE’s jurisdiction.  Probably “no other Joint Committee has ever been
given a comparable range of extraordinary authorities.”71
The principal powers and duties of the joint committee under the 1946
Atomic Energy Act were contained in Section 15(b), which provided that:
(b) The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of
the Atomic Energy Commission and of problems relating to the
development, use, and control of atomic energy.  The Commission shall
keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to the
Commission’s activities.  All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the
Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the
Commission or to the development, use, or control of atomic energy shall
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be referred to the joint committee.  The members of the joint committee
who are members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate,
and the members of the joint committee who are members of the House of
Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or
otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the
jurisdiction of their respective houses which are (1) referred to the joint
committee or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.72
Significant to the joint committee’s power was the provision contained in
section 15(b) of the act requiring that “the commission shall keep the joint committee
fully and currently informed”73 of its activities.
The import of the JCAE’s power contained in the “fully and currently
informed” language  is exemplified by the experience of Senator Stuart Symington
(D-MO). Senator Symington was a senior member of both the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committees when he joined the  JCAE in 1971.
Symington sought a place on the joint panel because, despite his seniority and
powerful committee assignments, he reportedly was unable to obtain certain
restricted information from the executive branch:
It was just this secrecy, and the way it was being used by the [JCAE] to
enhance its power, that prompted Senator Symington to obtain assignment
to the committee ... after the military had refused to tell his Foreign
Relations Subcommittee where atomic weapons were situated overseas.
Although he ... served on the Armed Services Committee for eighteen
years, Senator Symington was not aware, until he went to the [JCAE], of
how many atomic weapons the military had, where they were, or even how
they were purchased by the Pentagon.74
Section 15(b) of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act directed the committee to
“make continuing studies of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and of
problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy.”  The
committee’s mandate was “substantially more direct and explicit than the oversight
responsibilities generally conferred on committees of the House or Senate.”75
In another significant grant of power to the joint committee, the provisions
in section 15(e) authorized the JCAE “to utilize the services, information, facilities
and personnel ...” of the federal agency it oversaw.  Observers have stated that this
section in particular had the effect of blurring the line between the JCAE and the
executive agency it was tasked with overseeing, making the panel, in essence, a
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“legislative-administrative hybrid” where “the doctrine of executive privilege [came]
to be almost meaningless.”76
The fact that the JCAE was created by statute, rather than by concurrent
resolution, gave it a stronger position when dealing with the Executive.  “While
others have suggested that this distinction is not significant with respect to the actual
operations of the committee, it bears notice that the charge to the Atomic Energy
Commission to keep the committee ‘fully and currently  informed’ might have been
ignored ... if it had simply been included in a resolution of the Congress, and did not
have the force of law.”77
In 1954, the joint committee gained additional power when Congress passed
legislation to amend the original Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The “fully and
currently informed” provision of the 1946 Act which gave the JCAE full power over
the AEC was extended to the Department of Defense, insofar as “the development,
utilization or application of atomic energy” was concerned.  The 1954 amendment78
also added a directive to all other government agencies, stating, “Any government
agency shall furnish any information requested by the joint committee with respect
to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.”79
In addition to assuring the joint committee access to more restricted data, the
1954 amendments empowered the JCAE to “classify information originating within
the committee in accordance with standards used generally by the Executive Branch
for classifying restricted data or defense information.”80  This ability to classify
information contributed to the power of the joint committee by ensuring that it, and
no other congressional committee, could access such classified information.
Confirmation Procedure.  Like other Senate committees, the Senate
members of the JCAE conducted executive business, holding hearings on the
nominations of AEC Commissioners.  
These hearings were more than perfunctory.  The JCAE used its power over
confirmation as leverage over the executive branch. For example, following the
contentious term of Lewis Strauss as AEC Commissioner, the JCAE agreed to
confirm his successor, John A. McCone only after “public and executive hearings in
which McCone gave assurances that he adhered”81 to the JCAE’s vision of how the
AEC should be run.  Having made this pledge, “McCone was to demonstrate
repeatedly his readiness to join the JCAE ... in developing and in managing AEC
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programs, even to the extent of opposing the budgetary policies of the President”82
under whom he served.
The Senators also acted on international agreements and treaties in their area
of jurisdiction.83
Mission Orientation.  Some observers of the JCAE have noted that one
source of the joint committee’s power may have been intangible, rather than
statutory.  Scholars have observed that one fundamental characteristic of the JCAE,
aside from its unique nature as a joint panel and its considerable statutory power, was
its unswerving dedication to the development of nuclear power. As Green and
Rosenthal observed:
... unicameralism is not the major departure from tradition represented by
the JCAE.  The essence of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is its
positive sense of mission.84
In that sense, one important source of the JCAE’s power and effectiveness
was the fact that all its members were working toward a common goal.  The members
of the JCAE had a pro-nuclear power philosophy; definite objectives which they
believed should be achieved; and specific policies which they worked to have
implemented.  
Evolution of Joint Committee Powers
While the JCAE was, by all accounts, one of the most powerful committees
in congressional history, observers have pointed out that this power was achieved
through an evolution;  in essence, the JCAE grew into its substantial statutory
powers.  As Green and Rosenthal pointed out, the panel’s activities during its first
15 years:
... fall neatly into separate eras.  The years 1947, 1948, and 1949 may aptly
be characterized by a period in which the joint committee played a
relatively passive role. ... Commencing in late 1949, the committee’s role
appears to have changed markedly. ... it also began to assume a role of
vigorous leadership. ... In this role, it generally encouraged and exhorted
the willing but cautious AEC to expand programs ... in 1955 ...  the joint
committee sought to accelerate the nation’s civilian power program.  The
years 1955-1958 were marked by sharp controversy with the executive
branch.  During this period, the JCAE became a policy-forging institution,
greatly expanding the exercise of its statutory authority and exerting
influence the executive deemed unwarranted.  Finally, 1958-1960 were
years of relative calm during which the JCAE having won a position of
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leadership ... entrenched and consolidated its position with little opposition
from the executive.85
Over time, the JCAE came to have a unique relationship with both Congress
and the executive branch entities it oversaw.  
Authorizing Legislation.  Under the 1946 Act, the AEC had a permanent
authorization.  As a result, it was not necessary for the joint committee to hold
numerous hearings or initiate legislation, other than in the general context of
oversight or to promote issues that it viewed as policy priorities.86
The JCAE’s power over the AEC was not challenged in Congress by any
committees other than the appropriations panels.  According to Green and Rosenthal,
“The JCAE, during the early years, generally defended the AEC and its programs
against congressional criticism, particularly from the House Committee on
Appropriations.”87   During one fight with the Appropriations Committee, “... the
JCAE succeeded in achieving a compromise [on budget issues] acceptable to the
AEC”88 only by holding the Senate in session until dawn a day before a scheduled
adjournment.
The 1954 Atomic Energy Act required, for the first time, authorization
legislation for new construction projects and real estate acquisition.  In 1957, the
scope of this authorization broadened, and in 1963, Congress further expanded the
scope of the authorization process to cover all activities of the AEC.89   
From 1955, until the JCAE was disbanded in 1977, the joint committee
authored an annual authorization bill for certain commission programs, as well as
several supplemental authorization bills.  There were few occasions when
amendments were made to the joint committee’s recommendations either on the floor
of the House or the Senate.  That situation resulted largely from the legislation’s
consideration by the joint committee, instead of two separate committees, and the
close relationship between the AEC and the JCAE established by the 1946 Act which
allowed the executive branch and the joint committee to work out most policy
differences before reaching the legislative stage. 
In the few instances when a JCAE measure was amended, and a conference
committee needed to be appointed to resolve differences in House and Senate
measures, the conference was drawn from the House and Senate members of the joint
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committee itself.90  Serving as its own conference committee bolstered the JCAE’s
legislative power significantly.  Of the authorizing process, the joint committee
stated:
The requirement for authorizing legislation has proven of value in many
ways.  The Joint Committee receives testimony in both executive and open
hearings.  The hearings give a meaningful opportunity for detailed
examination of program needs, and furnish needed information to Members
of Congress in their consideration of the appropriation bills.”91
Legislative Veto.  Another important power wielded by the JCAE was its
use of the legislative veto.  Scholars have observed that one of the primary reasons
that the JCAE was effective in shaping policy was that it insisted on access to
information from the agencies it oversaw while matters were pending.   In this
regard, the JCAE often acted as a co-decision maker with the Executive, not simply
an observer of actions or decisions that had already occurred.  One of the
mechanisms that enabled the JCAE to play this role effectively was its extensive use
beginning in 1951, of the legislative veto.  (Subsequently, the legislative veto was
found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.)
The legislative veto, is defined as a procedure: 
... that allowed Congress or one of its houses to nullify certain actions of
the president, executive branch agencies, or independent agencies.
Legislative vetoes were also sometimes called congressional vetoes or
congressional disapprovals. Concurrent resolutions were required for
vetoes involving both houses, and simple resolutions were required for
action by one house. These procedures reversed the usual roles of the two
branches, permitting the executive, in effect, to make law subject to a veto
by the legislature.92
In 1951, Congress implemented legislative veto provisions stating that before
the AEC exchanged restricted atomic data with other nations, the proposed action
would have to lie before the joint committee “for a period of thirty days in which
Congress was in session.”93  
Later amendments to the Atomic Energy Act stipulated that decisions related
to the classification of information about nuclear materials, agreements of
cooperation, letting of long term contracts for electric utility service, and certain
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payments to contractors also be laid before the joint committee before action could
be taken.  Green and Rosenthal point out:
The obvious purpose of these provisions is to give the Joint Committee an
opportunity to block the contemplated Executive action ... The legislative
veto power of the JCAE is not unique as an inroad on Executive discretion.
Other congressional committees have the authority ... But the Joint
Committee’s legislative veto power stands alone in its breadth,
encompassing several key areas of administration of the atomic energy
program.94
In many instances, the legislative veto served only as a threat.  Due to the
close relationship between the JCAE and the AEC, and their roles as ‘co-decision
makers,’ the joint panel often got its way without resorting to the veto.
The Supreme Court case of I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983) declared unconstitutional
congressional veto of certain actions of the Executive by simple or concurrent
resolution.  
Relations with the Executive Branch
Some viewed the close relationship that the JCAE had with the executive
branch as not positive.  For example, when Senator Symington joined the JCAE, he
was, “admittedly shocked” by the JCAE’s arrangements and relationships,
particularly its seemingly seamless relationship with the AEC and the Pentagon.  In
particular, the JCAE staff seemed to be closely allied with forces in the Navy
promoting nuclear powered submarines. One press account said that Senator
Symington was particularly “disturbed over  ... the most unbelievable influence
exerted by Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover within the [joint] committee...and his
programs for nuclear powered ships and submarines costing billions of dollars.”95
If the JCAE had a unique relationship with the rest of Congress, it had an
equally unique relationship with the executive branch.  For the most part, the JCAE
and the AEC were closely allied, with the AEC deferring to, and consulting with, the
joint committee to an unprecedented degree in the formulation of policy.  For
example, joint committee member Representative Craig Hosmer (R-CA) expressed
in a 1960 speech that was reprinted in the Congressional Record particular
misgivings about the relationship between the joint committee and the agency it
oversaw, saying:
I sometimes feel that as between members of the Joint Committee and
members of the Atomic Energy Commission, there exists only a shadowy
and blurred understanding of which policy matters are to be decided by the
committee and which by the commission, even sometimes as to what are
matters of policy and what are matters of administration.  This needs
CRS-21
96 Green and Rosenthal, p. 21.
97 Donald C. Bacon, Roger H. Davidson, Morton Keller, eds., The Encyclopedia of the
United States Congress, 4 vols.  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 116-118.
98 Ibid.
clarification by force of law rather than force of personalities and
customs.96
It has been said that, for most of its existence, “the joint committee, in what
many consider to be an exception to the separation of powers principle ... reigned as
a legislative body with quasi-executive powers.  The AEC was subordinated to the
role of an operating board under the policy guidance of Congress.”97
The relationship, however, did go through periods of tension.   For example,
the JCAE’s dominance over the AEC was challenged during the Eisenhower
Administration.  In 1953, retired Admiral Lewis L. Strauss became the Atomic
Energy Commission’s chair.  Strauss served not only as AEC chair, but as an advisor
to the President on issues relating to atomic energy.  Strauss won a measure of
increased autonomy for the AEC through the 84th Congress (1955-1957), but then ran
into strong opposition from JCAE members when he insisted on keeping certain
information from the them because he felt it would violate his ability to offer
confidential counsel to the President.  Leading the charge against Strauss was Senator
Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico.  Senate Historian Richard A. Baker described
the relationship in this way:
Relations between the Admiral and the Senator had been strained since
1953 when Strauss had opposed plans to have the Tennessee Valley
Authority sell power to AEC installations in the area and refused to support
J. Robert Oppenheimer against Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s charges of
disloyalty. At the heart of Anderson’s bitter and unyielding attitude toward
Strauss lay his determination that Congress must take a part in the work of
Executive Branch agencies.  Accordingly, he reacted angrily at Strauss’s
efforts to withhold information from the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy.98
In late 1958, Strauss declined President Eisenhower’s offer of reappointment
for another term as chair of the AEC.  After Strauss’s appointment expired,
relationships between the joint committee and AEC became more stable and
harmonious. 
In 1973, upon the appointment of Dixie Lee Ray as AEC chair, significant
changes occurred in the relationship between the joint committee and the agency. 
Dr. Ray strove early on in her tenure to demonstrate strong leadership within the
commission and pressed for a new level of independence from the dictates of the
JCAE.  For example, heretofore, the JCAE insisted on having the final say over any
reorganizations of AEC staff.  Dr. Ray ignored this fact.  As one newspaper reported:
As her first big showdown with the Congressional committee, Dr. Ray
chose to reorganize the [AEC] staff.  That was a bold move in itself, since
CRS-22
99 John W. Finney, “New AEC Chairman Moves Against Dominance of Congressional Joint
Panel,” The New York Times, May 22, 1973, p. 17.
100 Ibid.
101 Jasper, The Oversight Role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,”  p. 12.
102 Donald C. Bacon, Roger H. Davidson, Morton Keller, eds., The Encyclopedia of the
United States Congress, 4 vols. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 116-118.
103 Jasper, The Oversight Role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, p. 12.
104 For additional information on the recommendations of the Bolling Committee, see CRS
(continued...)
the congressional committee tends to have a protective interest in the
organization of the commission.99
The reaction of joint committee members to Dr. Ray’s action was divided.
According to press reports, some JCAE members and staff were displeased with not
being consulted about the reorganization, while others admired Ray’s strong
leadership.100  Dr. Ray’s success in carrying out the reorganization over the wishes
of some on the JCAE underscored the observation made frequently by scholars that,
when the joint committee stood united, it almost always prevailed, both in its
dealings with Congress and the executive branch.  In those instances, however, when,
“there was a split in the commission, as well as on the joint committee, an AEC
Chairman with sufficient support in the commission could prevail.”101
The End of the Joint Committee
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 shifted the emphasis in nuclear policy from
weapons development  to civilian uses of atomic power.  “Over the next two decades,
as electricity from commercial reactors came on line, the policies of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy and the AEC attracted criticism.  Groups concerned
about the safety of nuclear power plants contended that the AEC’s dual role as
promoter and regulator of atomic energy constituted an inherent conflict of
interest.”102
At the beginning of the 1970s, Members of Congress evidenced increasing
concern about the safety and public health questions associated with nuclear power.
This concern began to emerge among some members of the JCAE itself.  For the first
time, the panel’s commitment to the promotion of nuclear power came into question.
“Some members [of the joint committee] wanted to convert the committee to a joint
committee on energy, while others resisted the change ... [and] the earlier
commitment to nuclear energy was weakened.”103
In the fall of 1974, President Gerald R. Ford signed legislation abolishing the
AEC and creating in its place the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).  Earlier that year, the
House Select Committee on Committees, led by Representative  Richard W. Bolling
(D-MO), recommended stripping the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of its
jurisdiction over civilian nuclear power.104  
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Amidst this climate, other congressional committees succeeded in chipping
away various aspects of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee’s jurisdiction.  On
October 8, 1974, the House adopted the Bolling Committee-inspired Committee
Reform Amendments of 1974, H. Res. 988.  The resolution included a new Section
3 in House Rule X providing special oversight functions for various committees.
Subsection (e) provided that:
The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs shall have
the function of reviewing and studying, on a continuous
basis, all laws, programs, and government activities
dealing with ... non-military nuclear energy and research
and development including disposal of nuclear waste105
Increasingly, the joint committee was subjected to severe criticism from
entities outside of Congress.  Activists in both parties argued that the joint
committee, “tended to be responsive only to the nuclear lobby and has failed to cope
effectively with proliferation of nuclear technology.”106  In 1976, the public advocacy
group Common Cause issued a 38-page study entitled “Stacking the Deck” in which
the joint committee was scathingly portrayed as a “huckster for the nuclear power
industry.”107
On August 5, 1977, the House and the Senate abolished the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.  As newspaper reports stated: 
This action by the Democratic majority in the House signaled the
determination of liberals to slow down the development of nuclear energy
and put more emphasis on environmental public health and non-
proliferation concerns .... The House action culminated a gradual erosion
of joint committee power that has been under way for several years ... the
glamour of atomic energy has given way to concern about the danger of
weapons proliferation among small nations and the problem of disposing
safely of the wastes produced by nuclear power stations.108
Conclusion and Possible Issues for 
Congressional Consideration
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission noted its view that, that making minor
changes to the structure of Congress’s system of intelligence oversight would not be
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enough to achieve the changes it felt were needed.  The Commission suggested the
Joint Atomic Energy Committee as one possible model for reform. 
The commission report goes on to state that the system of “Congressional
oversight for intelligence — and counterterrorism — is now dysfunctional.  Congress
should address this problem. [The Members of the 9/11 Commission] have
considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy is one.”109
Policymakers examining this recommendation might examine lessons from
the JCAE model.  The lessons hold a number of pros and cons, as well as raise
questions for consideration.  Green and Rosenthal summarize the work of the JCAE
panel to the year 1961, saying:
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is, in terms of sustained influence
within the Congress, its impact and influence on the Executive, and its
accomplishments, probably the most powerful congressional committee in
the history of the nation.  There can be little doubt that, had Congress
chosen to deal with atomic energy through conventional congressional
committees, the history of our atomic energy program would have been
quite different.  Almost certainly, the national investment in atomic energy
would have been substantially less and our present level of technology
considerably less advanced.110
A few of Green and Rosenthal’s most significant observations about the
JCAE are paraphrased here because of their relevance to the question of the JCAE’s
suitability as a model when crafting oversight mechanisms for the intelligence
agencies and for homeland security issues generally.  These observations included:
! By its skillful employment of its statutory powers, the JCAE made
unprecedented inroads in the doctrine of executive privilege.
! The JCAE’s comprehensive access to information and its insistence on
obtaining information while matters were pending gave  it the opportunity
to participate in the Executive’s formulation and implementation of
policies. 
! The JCAE exerted influence largely by continuously participating in the
Executive decision-making deliberations rather than by legislating.
! The JCAE steadfastly disregarded the patterns and procedures for
coordination and control employed by the executive branch in its support




! The JCAE  refused to recognize the validity of budgetary ceilings which
otherwise rule out programs it desired. 111 
Green and Rosenthal also identified a number of significant elements that
characterized the behavior of the JCAE in its relationship within Congress.  These
include:
! Members of Congress were somewhat more inclined to rely upon the
judgement of the JCAE  than on the judgement of other committees. 
! Members of Congress frequently have a broad knowledge and interest in
issues.  In the case of the JCAE,  however, relatively few Members of
Congress had either a high degree of knowledge about, or strong interest
in, the atomic energy program.
! Congressional information about atomic energy was much more closely
held than in the case of other subjects and other committees.
! The joint committee arrangement resulted in Congress being presented
with less opportunity for choice among alternative ideas.  Instead of a
choice from two or more measures, the House and Senate were faced with
one legislative product presented to them from the start of the process.
! There was a tendency for many important policy questions to be decided
in effect, by negotiations between JCAE and the Executive rather than
through the processes of public discussion or congressional debate.
! From 1957, the JCAE  made use of authorizing legislation to initiate
projects that the Executive opposed.
! When the joint committee was substantially united, the Congress almost
invariably followed its lead, even when the Administration was strongly
opposed.
! On most occasions, the JCAE relied on means other than legislation to
influence policy, was largely autonomous, exempt from congressional
control and from direct accountability to Congress.112
In examining the 9/11 Commission’s suggestion of the JCAE as a desirable
model for current congressional intelligence oversight, policymakers might also
consider the question of whether it is possible to “re-create” a JCAE in the modern
congressional climate.  
While Congress certainly has the ability to establish a similar panel with
similar statutory and legislative powers, one might question whether the totality of
factors that made the JCAE formidable could be reproduced today.
For example, policymakers examining the JCAE model might ask whether
currently accepted ideas about executive privilege and relations between the
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branches, as well as the change in the interests and roles of individual Members of
Congress, might result in a joint committee that behaved quite differently than the
JCAE even if it had the same statutory powers.  As one scholar observed of the
relationship between the JCAE and the Executive: 
From a practical standpoint, the success achieved by the Joint Committee
over the years in asserting a claim to policy-making authority has been due
to the inability or the unwillingness of the Executive Branch to assert an
effective counter claim.113  
Another factor to be weighed in this regard is the evidence that shows that the
JCAE was not created to be one of  the most powerful committees in congressional
history; it evolved into one as a result of the personalities of its members and
circumstances as much as the enormous powers it was given.  
The 9/11 Commission’s use of the JCAE as an oversight model present
lawmakers with unprecedented questions.  During its 30-year life, the JCAE never
encountered a period in which the House and Senate were controlled by different
political parties.  How such split party control of Congress, if it were to occur today,
would affect the oversight and legislative workload of such a joint committee is
simply unknown.
Policymakers might also wish to explore how many of the types of oversight
function performed by the JCAE are now already being performed in the homeland
security arena by the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland
Security and other spending sub-panels.  While the Committees on Appropriations
have always conducted important oversight of spending, it might be argued that
increasingly that oversight is not just focused on spending, but on the structure,
progress, and efficacy of programs — in essence, the ‘policy.’  A contributing factor
in this trend might be the tendency to pass large omnibus appropriations measures in
lieu of individual bills.
Regarding the homeland security arena, for example, the House and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security have made wide use of
reporting requirements in managing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
One estimate cited 60 separate additional reporting requirements on the
Administration stemming just from the FY2004 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations bill.114  These requirements spanned a range of subjects, from
activities of the department that affect privacy rights to how well emergency
procurement policies have worked for DHS. 
 In addition, the JCAE’s wide and effective use of the legislative veto would
not be possible today and policymakers considering the 9/11 Commission’s
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suggestion of the JCAE as a model might explore the implications of that fact.  The
Supreme Court decision in the case of INS vs. Chadha (462 U.S. 919, 1983), which
placed limits on  Congress’s ability to invalidate certain decisions of the executive
branch, presumably would deny a modern joint congressional committee one of the
most powerful tools in the JCAE’s arsenal.  On the other hand, policymakers might
discern that similar authority can be achieved through the use of another mechanism,
for example, through the aggressive use of appropriations report language.
While weighing policy options, it may also be useful to question how
analogous the issue of atomic energy is to the issues related to the failures in
intelligence oversight that apparently were the basis of the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendation.  In many ways, the issues are similar.  Both are issues of sweeping
importance and national attention.  Both require action and a high level of expertise,
coordination, secrecy, and specialized knowledge from Members.
In others ways, the situations are not analogous.  The JCAE benefitted from
the fact that most Members of Congress were not all that interested or knowledgeable
about the highly-technical issues in its jurisdiction and largely deferred to the panel’s
judgements and recommendations.   It is unlikely that would be the case with the
issues of intelligence and counter terrorism, where many Members have specialized
knowledge and virtually all Members have a strong interest.  This is particularly true
if policymakers were to expand the JCAE model to include oversight of the DHS and
counter terrorism generally, a subject field that includes the work of nearly every
authorizing committee of the House and Senate.
Lawmakers might also consider whether any contemporary congressional
panel could operate with the level of secrecy and with the monopoly over information
that the JCAE enjoyed in its prime.  It is worth noting that the “fully and currently
informed” language which the JCAE used to its full advantage during its years
overseeing the AEC and DOD on atomic energy issues was exactly replicated in the
language creating both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
in the Senate Select Committee in Intelligence.115  In other words, both congressional
intelligence committees already possess the same authority in this regard that the
JCAE enjoyed and have since their creation in the 1970s.   Policymakers examining
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations might question if that power is being
appropriately used by the intelligence oversight panels or if perhaps the power simply
does not hold the same force it did during the life of the JCAE.   These questions
might all be considered in the context of concerns raised by some, including the 9/11
Commission itself, that secrecy and complexity in intelligence functions are part of
the problem.  In its final report, the commission expressed its view that, “secrecy,
CRS-28
116 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (Washington: GPO,  2004), p. 103.
117 Ibid., p. 416.
while necessary, can also harm oversight”116 and called on Congress to make public
the overall amount of money being appropriated for national intelligence functions.117
Barring the question of whether such a joint entity could be re-created,
policymakers still face the question of whether such a model is a desirable one. 
Lawmakers who have expressed concern about the “iron triangle” nature of
congressional oversight or the tendency toward organization “group think” may not
find it desirable to have a single small congressional panel invested with the power
to authorize agencies’ programs, weigh in on the appropriations for budgets, confirm
officials, and act as its own conference committee in crafting governing legislation.
Others might argue that the advantages of the JCAE model outweigh these
concerns — offering the advantages of secrecy, increased coordination of oversight,
certainty and timeliness of action, and a reduction of duplication in energy and
administrative function.  They might further argue that the extraordinary challenges
of intelligence oversight merit a panel with extraordinary powers.  
Another consideration for policymakers examining the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendation of the JCAE as a possible model is the question of whether
something similar, but not identical to the JCAE, might be utilized to improve
intelligence oversight — in essence taking the best of the JCAE model and leaving
out those portions of the JCAE experience lawmakers find undesirable or politically
infeasible.    
For example, the congressional intelligence committees responded to the 9/11
attacks in part by launching an unprecedented joint inquiry in February 2002 to
investigate the intelligence community’s record and make recommendations for
further legislative action.   During these two months of hearings, the panels met
together.  One option might be to combine the JCAE and joint inquiry models.  The
two intelligence committees could remain separate, but come together as a powerful
joint panel during certain times of the year or to accomplish certain specific
functions, possibly when marking up the annual intelligence authorizing measure, or
to conduct budget hearings.
Another option might be to restore the idea of permitting members of such
a joint panel to serve as ex-officio members of their chamber’s Committee on
Appropriations when the panel considers its annual appropriations for the intelligence
budget.  Such a change might help in institutionalizing cooperative relationships
between appropriators and authorizers in each chamber and present a unified face to
the agencies Congress oversees.  
Another option might be to populate a joint committee with key members of
the relevant appropriations subcommittees and authorizing committees, establishing
in essence, a leadership panel to oversee the operations of the intelligence agencies.
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Another option might be to reject the JCAE model altogether, and try to
establish mechanisms that motivate the current intelligence committees to conduct
more rigorous oversight within the existing structure.
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Appendix 1. Membership of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy: 1946 - 1977118
79th Congress (1946)
Sen. Brien McMahon (D-CT), Chair
Rep. R. Ewing Thomason (D-TX), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC)
Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) Rep. Aime Forand (D-RI)
Sen. Tom Connally (D-TX) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. Harry Flood Byrd (D-VA) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) Rep. Charles H. Elston (R-OH)
Sen. Eugene D. Milliken (R-CO) Rep. J. Parnell Thomas (R-NJ)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. Carl Hinshaw (R-CA)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. Clare Booth Luce (R-CT)
80th Congress (1947-1948)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA), Chair
Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R-NY), Vice Chair
Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) Rep. Charles H. Elston (R-OH)
Sen. Eugene D. Milliken (R-CO) Rep. Carl Hinshaw (R-CA)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
Sen. John W. Bricker (R-OH) Rep. James T. Patterson (R-CT)
Sen. Brien McMahon (D-CT) Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC)
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Tom Connally (D-TX) Rep. Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX)
81st Congress (1949-1950)
Sen. Brien McMahon (D-CT), Chair
Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Tom Connally (D-TX) Rep. Paul J. Kilday (D-TX)
Sen. Millard E. Tydings (D-MD) Rep. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R-NY) 
Sen. Eugene D. Milliken (R-CO) Rep. Charles H. Elston (R-OH)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. Carl Hinshaw (R-CA)
Sen. John W. Bricker (R-OH) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
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82nd Congress (1951-1952)
Sen. Brien McMahon (D-CT) Chair
Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC) Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) Rep. Paul J. Kilday (D-TX)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R-NY) 
Sen. Eugene D. Milliken (R-CO) Rep. Charles H. Elston (R-OH)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. Carl Hinshaw (R-CA)
Sen. John W. Bricker (R-OH) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
83rd Congress (1953-1954)
Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R-NY), Chair
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA), Vice Chair
Sen. Eugene D. Milliken (R-CO) Rep. Carl Hinshaw (R-CA)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
Sen. John W. Bricker (R-OH) Rep. James T. Patterson (R-CT)
Sen. Guy R. Cordon (R-OR) Rep. Thomas A. Jenkins (R-OH)
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Paul J. Kilday (D-TX)
84th Congress (1955-1956)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM), Chair
Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Paul J. Kilday (D-TX)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. John J. Dempsey (D-NM)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R-NY)
Sen. Eugene D. Milliken (R-CO) Rep. Carl Hinshaw (R-CA)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
Sen. John W. Bricker (R-OH) Rep. James T. Patterson (R-CT)
85th Congress (1957-1958)
Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC), Chair
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Paul J. Kilday (D-TX)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
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Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
Sen. William F. Knowland (R-CA) Rep. James T. Patterson (R-CT)
Sen. John W. Bricker (R-OH) Rep. Thomas A. Jenkins (R-OH)
Sen. Henry Dworshak (R-ID) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Rep. Craig Hosmer was appointed on January 15, 1958 to fill a vacancy created by
the resignation of Rep. Sterling Cole as a Member of Congress.  Rep. Cole accepted
a position as Director General of the International Atom Energy Agency.  Rep.
Wayne N. Aspinall was appointed on March 17, 1958 to fill a vacancy created by the
death of Rep. John J. Dempsey on March 11, 1958.
86th Congress (1959-1960)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM), Chair
Rep. Carl T. Durham (D-NC), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Albert Thomas (D-TX)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA)
Sen. Henry Dworshak (R-ID) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. William H. Bates (R-MA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. Jack Westland (R-WA)
Rep. Albert Thomas was appointed to the joint committee on February 16, 1959 to
fill the vacancy created by the resignation dated January 21, 1959, of Rep. Paul J.
Kilday.
87th Congress (1961-1962)
Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA), Chair
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Albert Thomas (D-TX)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Thomas G. Morris (D-NM)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. James E. Van Zandt (R-PA) Rep.
Sen. Henry Dworshak (R-ID) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. William H. Bates (R-MA) 
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. Jack Westland (R-WA)
Senator Everett M. Dirksen was appointed on July 31, 1962 to fill the vacancy
created by the death of Sen. Henry Dworshak on July 23, 1962.
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88th Congress (1963-1964)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Chair
Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Albert Thomas (D-TX)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Thomas G. Morris (D-NM)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. William H. Bates (R-MA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. Jack Westland (R-WA)
Sen. Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
Sen. Carl T. Curtis was appointed to the JCAE on February 11, 1963 to fill the
vacancy created by the resignation of Sen. Everett M. Dirksen on the same date.
89th Congress (1965-1966)
Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA), Chair
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Albert Thomas (D-TX)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Thomas G. Morris (D-NM)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. William H. Bates (R-MA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
Sen. Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) Rep. William M. McCulloch (R-OH)
Rep. John Young was appointed on March 1, 1966 to fill the vacancy created by the
death of Rep. Albert Thomas on February 15, 1966.
90th  Congress (1967-1968)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Chair
Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. Thomas G. Morris (D-NM)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. John Young (D-TX)
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. William H. Bates (R-MA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
Sen. Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) Rep. William M. McCulloch (R-OH)
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91st  Congress (1969-1970)
Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA), Chair
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Vice Chair
Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-GA) Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL)
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN) Rep. John Young (D-TX)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Ed Edmondson (D-OK)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
Sen. Carl T. Curtis (R-NE) Rep. William M. McCulloch (R-OH)
Sen. Norris Cotton (R-NH) Rep. Catherine May (R-WA)
Sen. Norris Cotton was appointed on January 23, 1969 to fill the vacancy created by
the retirement of Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper.  Rep. Catherine May was appointed
on July 24, 1969 to fill the vacancy created by the death of William H. Bates on June
22, 1969.
92nd  Congress (1971-1972)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Chair
Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL), Vice Chair
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Wayne N. Aspinall (D-CO)
Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) Rep. John Young (D-TX)
Sen. Alan Bible (D-NV) Rep. Ed Edmondson (D-OK)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
Sen. Peter H. Dominick (R-CO) Rep. William M. McCulloch (R-OH)
Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-TN) Rep. Orval Hansen (R-ID)
Sen. Stuart Symington was appointed on January 28, 1971 to fill the vacancy created
by the death of Sen. Richard B. Russell on January 21, 1971.  Sen. Peter H.
Dominick was appointed on February 10, 1971 to fill the vacancy created by the
resignation of Sen. Carl T. Curtis on February 4, 1971.  Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr.
was appointed on February 10, 1971 to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of
Sen. Norris Cotton on February 10, 1971.  
93rd Congress (1973-1974)
Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL), Chair
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Vice Chair
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. Chet Holifield (D-CA)
Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) Rep. John Young (D-TX)
Sen. Alan Bible (D-NV) Rep. Teno Roncalio (D-WY)
Sen. Joseph M. Montoya (D-NM) Rep. Mike McCormack (D-WA)
Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VT) Rep. Craig Hosmer (R-CA)
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-UT) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
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Sen. Peter H. Dominick (R-CO) Rep. Orval Hansen (R-ID)
Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-TN) Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM)
Rep. John E. Moss was appointed on December 13, 1974 to fill the vacancy created
by the resignation of Chet Holifield on December 13, 1974.  Sen. Alan Bible resigned
from Congress on December 17, 1974.
94th Congress (1975-1976)
Sen. John O. Pastore (D-RI), Chair
Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL), Vice Chair
Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) Rep. John Young (D-TX)
Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) Rep. Teno Roncalio (D-WY)
Sen. Joseph M. Montoya (D-NM) Rep. Mike McCormack (D-WA)
Sen. John V. Tunney (D-CA) Rep. John E. Moss (D-CA)
Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-TN) Rep. John B. Anderson (R-IL)
Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM)
Sen. James B. Pearson (R-KS) Rep. Frank Horton (R-NY)
Sen. James L. Buckley (R-NY) Rep. Andrew J. Hinshaw (R-CA)
